最近正在讀巴菲特給股東的信，從1957開始。當(dāng)時巴菲特還只是一個27歲的青年投資者，僅有兩年正式的職業(yè)投資經(jīng)驗。1954-1956年，巴菲特曾經(jīng)在格雷厄姆的投資公司工作。在那之前，巴菲特提出免費給格雷厄姆工作，但遭到了拒絕。他給股東的信忠實的記錄了一個投資者成長的歷程。
 
        在1957-1961年的信中，有幾段話吸引了我的注意：
 
        基金的目標
 
       “My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve along-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more orless parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.”
 
      “我管理合伙基金的一貫?zāi)繕耸侨〉脙?yōu)于道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)的長期業(yè)績。我堅信這一平均指數(shù)在長期將與領(lǐng)先的投資公司的業(yè)績相類似。除非我們?nèi)〉眠@樣優(yōu)異的業(yè)績，否則我們的合伙基金沒有理由存在下去?！?
 　
      （1960年給合伙人的信）
 　
        巴菲特最初的目標是長期業(yè)績超越指數(shù)。這個目標至今沒有改變。
 
        如何獲得超越市場的業(yè)績
 　
      “However,I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.”
 
        “但是，我曾經(jīng)指出，即使我們可能取得優(yōu)秀的業(yè)績，這也不能證明我們能保持相對穩(wěn)定的對道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)的優(yōu)勢。如果我們獲得優(yōu)勢，也是通過在平穩(wěn)或下跌市場中超出平均的業(yè)績，在上漲的市場中獲得平均業(yè)績，甚至有可能是遜于平均的業(yè)績而達到?！?BR> 
        （1960年給合伙人的信）
 
         巴菲特告訴自己的合伙人，自己超越市場不是持續(xù)穩(wěn)定的超越，具有穩(wěn)定的優(yōu)勢，而是在市場不好時超越，在市場狂熱時表現(xiàn)一般，甚至遜色。換句話說，戰(zhàn)勝市場不是多贏，而是少輸?！?
 
        衡量業(yè)績的標準
 
         “I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.

I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.
 
        While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market.”
 
        “我堅信在行動前制定標準。因為事后再看，幾乎任何事情，相對于某些其他事物，都能顯得很好?！　?
 
         我一直用道瓊斯工業(yè)平均指數(shù)作為我們衡量的基準。我感覺三年是檢驗業(yè)績的最短時間。最佳的檢驗至少要包括三年的時間，而道瓊斯指數(shù)的終值與初始值相當(dāng)接近。　
 
        雖然道瓊斯指數(shù)并不是衡量業(yè)績的完美指標（任何事物都不是），但這個指數(shù)有著廣為人知，長期的連續(xù)性，以及相當(dāng)準確的反映了市場投資者情況的優(yōu)勢。”　　
 
        （1961年給合伙人的信）　　
 
         巴菲特選取指數(shù)是為了有一個公平的標準。而且，他認為要評價投資業(yè)績最少要三年的時間，而且最好是在這段時間里市場持平。這樣才能體現(xiàn)出投資的真實業(yè)績，而不是短期運氣，或者隨著市場水漲船高?！?
 
        保守的投資

“Many people so me years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.　
 
         Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as in the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.”　　
 
          “True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.”　　
 
           “多年前很多人認為購買中期或者長期政府債券是最保守的做法。這種方式造成了大量的損失，而且肯定無法保持或者增加真實購買力?！?
 
           由于意識到通脹，甚至過于擔(dān)心通脹，很多人認為他們不顧市盈率、股息率等指標購買大型藍籌股是保守的做法。即使不考慮過去債券的例子，我也認為這種做法充滿危險。在我看來，投機毫無保守可言，投機只不過是猜想貪婪而變化無常的公眾能給盈利多高的倍數(shù)?！薄　?
 
          “真正的保守惟有通過知識和理性才有可能?！薄?
 
           （1961年給合伙人的信）　　
 
            50年前的忠告同樣適合今天的人們。不顧租售比，不考慮價格買房的人并不是在通脹條件下進行保守的保值投資。預(yù)期房價不斷上漲，其實就是預(yù)期貪婪而變化無常的公眾將給房子支付更高的價格。

  內(nèi)在價值的回歸與賣出時機
 
          被低估股票的價格何時能回歸內(nèi)在價值？如何才能回歸內(nèi)在價值？在什么情況下要賣出所投資的股票？巴菲特的回答如下：
 
        “Some times these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.”
 
         “有時候很快就能實現(xiàn)。更多的時候，需要幾年。在買入的時候很難知道有哪一個具體的原因讓股票價格應(yīng)該上漲。但是，正是由于這種缺乏魅力或者沒有期待，才有可能創(chuàng)造出當(dāng)前有利的市場機會。這些股票可以用非常便宜的價格獲得。通過支付低價，我們能獲得很多價值。這種大量的超額價值在每個交易中創(chuàng)造出一個相當(dāng)大的安全邊際。這種個股的安全邊際加上投資的分散性，創(chuàng)造出了一個最有吸引力的組合，具有安全性和升值潛力。在過去幾年，我們買入的時間點一直遠好于賣出的時機。我們買入這些股票時并沒有想獲得最后一分錢的利潤。我們往往滿足于在買入價和合理價位中間賣掉。我們認為的合理價位是對私人業(yè)主來說公平的價格?！?
 
         (1961年給合伙人的信)
 
          價值投資的安全性 
 
          價值投資的安全性不是來自于高超的賣點選擇，而是來自于買入的低價。 
 
          By buying assets at a bargain price, we don't need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: “Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake.”
 
         通過低價買入資產(chǎn)，我們無需施展魔術(shù)才能得到非常好的百分比回報。我們投資哲學(xué)的基石是：“絕不指望好的賣出。而是讓購買價格如此之誘人，即使一個平庸的賣出也能帶來良好的回報。更好的賣出將會是錦上添花?！?
 
         (1962年給合伙人的信)
 
         股市下跌的情況
 
         價值投資，安全邊際，購買便宜的股票也不能避免下跌。市場漲跌左右短期表現(xiàn)。
 
         The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.
 
          我們的股票傾向與市場表現(xiàn)一致。便宜并不意味著不會進一步下跌。在市場突然下跌的時候，這些股票完全可能與道瓊斯指數(shù)一樣，下降同樣的百分比。從長期看，我相信這些股票將超過道瓊斯指數(shù)的表現(xiàn)。在1961年那樣猛烈上漲的市場，這部分股票在我們的投資組合中表現(xiàn)是最佳的。當(dāng)然，在一個下跌的市場，這部分也是最容易受到損失的。
 
         (1961年給合伙人的信)
 
         對投資人的承諾 
 
         結(jié)果無法保證，目標可以承諾，投入全部身家，與合伙人利益保持高度一致。
 
         I can not promise results to partners. What I can and do promise is that:

a.Our investments will be chosen on the basis of value, not popularity;
 
         b.That we will attempt to bring risk of permanent capital loss (not short-term quotational loss) to an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each commitment and a diversity ofcommitments;and

c.My wife, children and I will have virtually our entire net worth invested in the partnership.
 
         我無法對合伙人承諾結(jié)果。我能夠承諾而且確定承諾的是：
 
         a.我們投資的選擇是基于價值，而不是流行。
 
         b.我們會試圖把資本永久損失（而不是短期賬面損失）的風(fēng)險降到絕對最低。而這是通過每個投資的大的安全邊際和投資的分散性達到的。
 
        c.我的妻子，孩子和我將把我們幾乎全部的凈值都投資在合伙基金中。
 
         (1962年給合伙人的信)
 
         對投資業(yè)績的檢驗
 
         市場下跌是對投資是否保守的客觀考驗。無需患得患失，少輸勝過多贏。
 
          I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow.
 
         我認為通過評估在下跌市場中的業(yè)績，我們可以得到最客觀的關(guān)于投資方式有多保守的檢驗。最好是道瓊斯指數(shù)下跌很多的時候。
 
        (1962年給合伙人的信) 

       Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%.
 
        我們的任務(wù)是積累年復(fù)一年超越道瓊斯指數(shù)的業(yè)績，而不是過度擔(dān)心某一年的絕對結(jié)果是正還是負。我認為道指下跌25%而我們只下跌15%的一年要遠好于道指和我們都上漲20%的一年。 
        (1962年給合伙人的信)